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IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY IN LEMONS MARKETS
ABHINAY MUTHOO AND SURESH MUTUSWAMI
ABSTRACT. This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of inefficiency in lemons
markets. More precisely, we characterize the second-best mechanism (i.e., the optimal mecha-
nism with private information) in a stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and
sellers. We then study the relationship between the degree of efficiency of the second-best
mechanism and market competitiveness. The relationship between the first-best and second-
best mechanisms is also explored.
JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D4, D61, D82.
“. . . most cars traded will be the “lemons,” and good cars may not be traded at all. The
“bad” cars tend to drive out the good (in much the same way that bad money drives
out the good).” GEORGE A. AKERLOF, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 1970.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background. It is conventional wisdom that competition is a good thing. The more the
better. By fostering appropriate individual incentives, competition can help promote aggre-
gate (or social) welfare. Economics textbooks are replete with models in which aggregate
welfare increases with the degree of competition. One classic example of this key insight is
provided by Cournot’s model of imperfect competition: in this model, the difference between
the Nash equilibrium market price and the constant marginal cost of production is strictly
decreasing (and aggregate welfare is strictly increasing) in the number of competing firms.
Does competition have a similar beneficial impact in markets with asymmetric informa-
tion? While it is well established that such markets tend in general to be inefficient (except
perhaps in the restrictive, limiting scenario when they contain an arbitrarily large number
of traders), much less is known about how the degree of inefficiency varies with the degree of
competition. An overall aim of this paper is to answer this question for markets with quality
uncertainty, which, following Akerlof (1970), are termed lemons markets.
It goes without saying that a better understanding of the relationship between competition
and efficiency in lemons markets is useful not only from a theoretical perspective but also
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from a practical (market-design and policy) perspective. Such understanding should pro-
vide insight into the role played by competition on how well lemons markets function and
perform.
A distinguishing characteristic of a lemons market is that when contemplating the possi-
bility of bilateral trade, one of the traders has relatively more information about something
(eg., quality of the object for sale) that affects both traders’ payoffs from trade. Such markets
are ubiquitous, and have been intensely studied over the past three decades, both by eco-
nomic theorists and by applied economists in the context of specific markets such as credit
and labour markets. In his seminal paper, George Akerlof was the first to argue that lemons
markets will typically be inefficient: sellers owning high quality objects may fail to trade,
although there are buyers who would wish to trade with them. The basic intuition for this
fundamental observation stems from the incentives of the sellers owning low quality objects:
each such seller has an incentive to pretend to own a high quality object in order to command
a high price for her, actually, low quality object. The consequence of such incentives is that
buyers may not be prepared to buy at a price that is high enough for trade to be profitable for
sellers owning high quality objects.
1.2. Our Contribution. We consider a stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers
and sellers, in which each seller has private information about the quality of the object that
she owns. A main objective is to characterize the maximal possible degree of efficiency that
such a market can attain in any equilibrium. As such we do not study this market with any
given, specific set of trading rules. This is because doing so would leave open the possibility
that with a different set of trading rules it might be the case that a higher degree of efficiency is
attained in equilibrium. Instead, we characterize the second-best mechanism, which defines the
maximal achievable level of efficiency. Our approach thus involves considering all outcomes
that can be achieved as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of some game (induced by some set of
trading rules). In order to conduct such a normative exercise, we use the mechanism design
methodology, in which details of the trading rules are irrelevant. Of course, this exercise is
made possible by appealing to the Revelation Principle, which allows us to confine attention to
direct mechanisms in which agents truthfully report their private information.
A central contribution of this paper, therefore, is the characterization of the second-best mech-
anism (i.e., the optimal mechanismwith private information) in a stylized lemonsmarket with
finite numbers of buyers and sellers. That is, we characterize the mechanism which maxi-
mizes expected social surplus subject to satisfying appropriate incentive compatibility and in-
dividual rationality constraints, and being budget balanced. This analysis extends Samuelson
(1984) who characterized the second-best mechanism for bilateral lemons markets. Samuel-
son, like us, uses the mechanism design methods introduced by Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) who characterized the second-best mechanism for bilateral markets with private val-
ues. Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) extend Myerson and Satterthwaite by characterizing the
second-best mechanism for finite markets with private values.
Having characterized the second-best mechanism, we then study its properties. In particu-
lar, we show that the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism (and its relationship
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to the first-best) depends on the numbers of buyers and sellers, the likelihood of any seller
owning a lemon rather than a peach, and whether the gains from trade are higher from trad-
ing a lemon or from trading a peach.1 In order to highlight some of our results, we now
briefly describe a few of the properties of the relationship between relative efficiency and
market competitiveness, where the former is the “distance” (eg., ratio) between the degree of
efficiency of the second-best mechanism and the first-best.2
Consider the scenario in which the market contains a single buyer and N ≥ 1 sellers, in
which the likelihood of any seller owning a lemon is sufficiently high, and the gains from
trade are higher from trading a peach than from trading a lemon. In this case, we show that
for relatively small lemons markets, the relationship between relative efficiency and compe-
tition is either monotonic (strictly increasing or strictly decreasing) or non-monotonic, de-
pending on exact parameter values. For relatively large lemons markets, relative efficiency
is strictly decreasing in the degree of competition (i.e., the optimal mechanism becomes less
efficient relative to the first-best when the number of sellers is increased beyond a certain crit-
ical point). One (policy) implication is that the “optimal” degree of competition is uniquely
defined and is bounded away from being “too large”.
While the properties of the optimal mechanism when the number of buyers is arbitrary
but strictly less than the number of sellers are similar to those when there is a single buyer,
the optimal mechanism is distinctively different when the number of competing sellers is less
than or equal to the number of buyers. In this latter case, we show that if the likelihood of any
seller owning a lemon is sufficiently small, then the optimal mechanism implements the first-
best. If, on the other hand, the likelihood of any seller owning a lemon is sufficiently large,
then the ratio of the maximal achievable level of expected surplus to the first-best expected
surplus is a constant, strictly less than one. Thus, when the number of buyers in the market is
greater than or equal to the number of sellers, increasing the number of sellers (while main-
taining the number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers) does not affect maximal
efficiency.
Before proceeding further, we should mention that our results establish that lemons mar-
kets will in general not attain the first-best outcome even in the limit as the number of com-
peting traders becomes arbitrarily large. This specific result is perhaps not that unexpected,
although it should be contrasted with the positive (limiting) result that has been established
for markets with other kinds of asymmetric information such as with private values (see, for
example, Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams, 1994).
1A “lemon” denotes a low quality object, while a “peach” denotes a high quality object.
2We study this relationship in two alternative ways. First, we keep the number of buyers fixed, and study
how maximal expected social surplus changes as the number of sellers is increased. This is the typical approach
adopted by the literature that studies the same issue (of the relationship between efficiency and competition) for
markets with symmetric information; for an example of recent work along these lines, see Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2004). Second, we study how maximal expected social surplus changes as the numbers of buyers and
sellers increases while keeping the buyer-seller ratio constant. This is the traditional replication scenario adopted
by the literature on markets with private values; see, for example, Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams, 1994).
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1.3. Organization of the Paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
lays down our baseline model, as follows. Subsection 2.1 describes our basic market environ-
ment: in this benchmark set-up, there is a single buyer and a finite number of sellers, where
each seller is one of two “types” and the sellers’ types are independently and identically dis-
tributed. Furthermore, it is assumed that trading a peach generates a higher surplus than
trading a lemon. Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 formulate the mechanism design problem. Section
3 solves this problem, characterizes the second-best mechanism, and derives the relationship
between the efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market competitiveness (and com-
pares all this to the first-best).
Section 4 considers several extensions to our baseline model, as follows. Subsection 4.1
studies the alternative scenario in which trading a lemon generates a higher surplus than
trading a peach, and subsection 4.2 studies the general case with arbitrary numbers of buyers
and sellers. Subsections 4.3–4.6 briefly consider several other extensions including ones that
consider environments with a continuum of types, correlation in the sellers’ types, and private
information on the buyer’s side.
We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of some aspects of our model and main results,
and relate our contribution to the literature. In particular, in subsection 5.2, we study how the
efficiency of the second-best mechanism responds to an increase in both the number of sellers
and the number of buyers while keeping the ratio of these numbers constant. This exercise
offers an alternative perspective on the relationship between efficiency and competitiveness.
The results and insights obtained are similar to those obtained when we keep the number of
buyers constant while changing the number of the sellers.
2. THE BASELINE MODEL
2.1. Market Environment. The market in the baseline model consists of a single buyer and
a finite number N of sellers, where N ≥ 1. Each seller owns one unit of an indivisible object
whose quality q is her private information. It is either low quality (a “lemon”), q = L, or high
quality (a “peach”), q = H. The probability that it is a lemon isα and the probability that it is
a peach is 1−α, where 0 < α < 1.
The buyer is interested in acquiring one and only one unit of the object. He values a lemon
at vL and a peach at vH, where vH > vL. A seller’s reservation values for a lemon and a peach
are respectively cL and cH, where cH > cL. If the buyer acquires an object of quality q at price
p, then his net payoff is vq − p (where q = L,H and p ≥ 0); and if a seller owning an object of
quality q sells it at price p, then her net payoff equals p− cq.3 If an agent does not trade, then
his or her net payoff is zero. All agents are risk-neutral and maximize expected utility.
The surpluses from trading a lemon and a peach are respectively sL ≡ vL − cL and sH ≡
vH − cH, where sL > 0 and sH > 0. In the baseline model, we assume that sH > sL — i.e.,
trading a peach generates a higher surplus than trading a lemon — as this is the relatively
more interesting and more plausible case.
3While the buyer may ascertain the quality of an object after acquiring it, the terms of trade cannot be made
contingent on quality since that is non-verifiable by “third” parties (such as the courts).
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In subsection 4.1 we study the alternative scenario in which sL > sH. While the logic and
much of the analysis in this case is similar to that of the baseline model in which sH > sL,
the main results (concerning in particular the properties of the second-best mechanism) are
rather different. Hence, for the sake of expositional clarity, it is instructive to deal with these
two scenarios separately. Before proceeding further, we should note that for similar reasons
the baseline model considers a market with a single buyer (and N sellers), and we extend the
baseline model to the general case of M buyers and N sellers in subsection 4.2. The analysis
and main insights when M < N are similar to the single buyer (M = 1) case. But some of the
analysis and the main results when M ≥ N are different from the M < N case. This arises
because in the former case it is feasible for all sellers to trade while that it is not so in the latter
case.
2.2. Incentive Constraints, Participation Constraints and Budget Balance. By a standard
appeal to the Revelation Principle, it suffices to focus on direct mechanisms where each seller
announces her type and themechanism selects an outcome conditional on the announcements
of all sellers.4 Furthermore, without loss of generality, we restrict attention to symmetric
mechanisms where the outcome does not depend on the names of the sellers.5 Following the
Revelation Principle, the mechanism needs to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints.
We also require it to satisfy the participation (or individual rationality) constraints and be
budget balanced.6
Given a direct, symmetric mechanism, let pˆq be the probability that a seller sells her object
if she reports that she is a q-type seller (q = L,H). Correspondingly, let tˆq be the expected
revenue that she obtains by doing so.7 A mechanism is incentive-compatible (IC) if and only if
4The institutional interaction that underlies a direct mechanism allows a seller to signal her privately held
information through two instruments, namely, price and probability of trade. This is restrictive in the sense that
other (costly) instruments such as warranties or “money burning” actions are not part of the structure of a direct
mechanism. However, the key point of the Revelation Principle is that any outcome that can be generated by any
indirect mechanism — including mechanisms that allow for a richer institution interaction, with various other
instruments through which information could possibly be signalled and/or screened — can be attained through
some direct mechanism. Hence, for the purposes of deriving and characterizing the second-best (which is the focus
of the current paper), one can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct mechanisms.
5The argument for why the restriction to symmetric mechanisms is without loss of generality is based on the
following two observations: (i) an asymmetric mechanism is equivalent to a random mechanism (one that picks
a symmetric mechanism randomly), and (ii) a random mechanism can do no better than a symmetric mechanism
(by definition).
6The former requirement is motivated by the notion that trade is voluntary, while the latter by the notion that
there are no “third” parties (such as governments) who subsidize market trade.
7This characterization of a direct mechanism follows from the Revelation Principle, which says that any outcome
of any indirect mechanism can be captured in this way, with type-contingent expected transfers and trade proba-
bilities. Wilson (1979, 1980) are early contributions to the literature on lemons markets in which trade probabilities
also feature, but his analysis is restricted to three specific classes of indirect mechanisms. He does not adopt the
mechanism design methodology that underlies the analysis in the current paper which allows us to characterize
the second-bestmechanism, and maximal efficiency attainable across all possible trading mechanisms.
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no type of a seller benefits strictly by misrepresenting her type.8
tˆH − pˆHcH ≥ tˆL − pˆLcH , and(1)
tˆL − pˆLcL ≥ tˆH − pˆHcL.(2)
Individual Rationality (IR) for an arbitrary seller of type q (q = H, L) requires that the expected
payoff from themechanism be at least the payoff from the outside option, which is normalized
to zero.
tˆH − pˆHcH ≥ 0, and(3)
tˆL − pˆLcL ≥ 0.(4)
Individual Rationality for the buyer follows the same principle. Since the buyer does not
know the type of object owned by any seller, individual rationality requires that his expected
payoff from transacting with any individual seller must be non-negative. This yields (using
the requirement that the mechanism be budget balanced, BB)
(5) (1−α)
[
pˆHvH − tˆH
]
+α
[
pˆLvL − tˆL
]
≥ 0.
The symmetry of the mechanism entails restrictions on pˆH and pˆL. From the point of view
of an individual seller of type H, the probability that there are k other sellers of type H is
given by (N−1k )(1−α)kαN−1−k; and in this case, symmetry implies that she sells her product
with a probability at most 1/(k+ 1). Taking expectations across all possible realizations of k,
it follows that
(6) pˆH ≤ 1−α
N
N(1−α) .
Using a similar argument, it also follows that
(7) pˆL ≤ 1− (1−α)
N
Nα
.
The probability of sale between an arbitrarily chosen seller and the buyer is (1−α) pˆH +α pˆL.
Since the total probability with which trade occurs must be less than or equal to one, the
mechanism must also satisfy
(8) N[(1−α) pˆH +α pˆL] ≤ 1.
2.3. Mechanism Design Problem. The expected surplus realized from a symmetric, direct
mechanism is N[(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL]. Observe that the expression in the square brackets is
the expected surplus from the transaction between an arbitrarily chosen seller and the buyer.
The mechanism design problem is to choose a symmetric, direct mechanism amongst those
that satisfy the two IC constraints, three IR constraints (within which has been factored the
requirement of BB) and three admissibility constraints that generates the maximal expected
surplus. Formally, this problem is:
8The first inequality is an arbitrary high-type seller’s IC condition while the second is an arbitrary low-type
seller’s IC condition.
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(9) E ≡ max
pˆH , pˆL ,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL
]
subject to (1)–(8).
The solution to this maximization problem defines the second-best mechanism (i.e., the
optimal mechanism with private information), to which we now turn.
3. SECOND-BEST MECHANISM
3.1. A Reduced-Form Problem. We solve (9) by defining and solving a reduced-form prob-
lem that involves the following change of variables:
p˜H = N(1−α) pˆH and p˜L = Nα pˆL,
where p˜H and p˜L are respectively the total probabilities with which trade occurs between the
buyer and sellers owning peaches and lemons. Given this change of variables, the constraints
(6)–(8) become
p˜H ≤ 1−αN ,(10)
p˜L ≤ 1− (1−α)N and(11)
p˜L + p˜H ≤ 1,(12)
and the maximand in (9) becomes p˜HsH + p˜LsL. Note that 1−αN (resp., 1− (1−α)N) is the
probability that there exists at least one seller amongst the N sellers who owns a peach (resp.,
a lemon). The two IC conditions are satisfied only if the following inequality holds:9
pˆH ≤ pˆL,
which, using the change of variables defined above, becomes:
(13) p˜H ≤
[
1−α
α
]
p˜L.
This implication of the sellers’ IC conditions — namely, that the probability pˆH with which
trade occurs with a high-type seller is no greater than the probability pˆL with which trade
occurs with a low-type seller — turns out to be the binding constraint for some scenarios. In
the other scenarios, it is a buyer’s induced IR constraint (defined below) which will be the
binding constraint. The following lemma contains several other preliminary results:
Lemma 1. At a solution to the mechanism design problem (9), the low-type seller’s IC constraint, (2),
binds as does the high-type seller’s IR constraint, (3). That is:
tˆH = pˆHcH and tˆL = pˆHcH + ( pˆL − pˆH)cL.
Furthermore, the low-type seller’s IR constraint is automatically satisfied with these transfers.
9This follows by rewriting (1) and (2) as ( pˆH − pˆL)cH ≤ tˆH − tˆL ≤ ( pˆH − pˆL)cL, and then applying the
assumption that cH > cL.
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Proof. See Appendix A. 
Using Lemma 1, substitute for tˆH and tˆL in the individual rationality constraint of the buyer,
(5), and it becomes (after using the change of variables defined above, and some simplifica-
tion):
(14) p˜H
[
sH −α(vH − cL)
]
+ (1−α) p˜LsL ≥ 0.
It should perhaps be emphasized that inequality (14) is not the buyer’s IR constraint, but
the buyer’s “induced” IR constraint as it is derived after the transfers implied by two of the
constraints are plugged into the buyer’s IR constraint.
Now define the following reduced-form problem:
(15) E∗ ≡ max
p˜H , p˜L
p˜HsH + p˜LsL
subject to (10)–(14).
The following lemma establishes the connection between the two maximization problems:
Lemma 2. Using the change of variables defined above and the expected transfer payments stated in
Lemma 1, any solution of (15) defines a solution of (9) and vice-versa. Moreover, E = E∗.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Given Lemma 2, we are now ready to solve for the second-best mechanism by solving the
reduced-form maximization problem (15).
3.2. Second-Best Expected Surplus. Define α∗ = sH/(vH − vL). Note that α∗ > 0 since (by
assumption) vH > vL and vH > cH. Furthermore,α∗ < 1 if and only if vL < cH.
Propositions 1 and 2 (below) respectively state the expected surplus E associated with the
second-best mechanism when α ≤ α∗ and α > α∗. We sketch the main elements of the
argument in the text below, but relegate the detailed calculations to Appendix A (where the
solution that underpins the second-best expected surplus is also derived). As will become
clear, some of the analysis and most of the results differ according to whether α ≤ α∗ or
α > α∗. This arises because in the former (“soft” buyer) case the buyer’s induced IR constraint
does not bind (it is the sellers’ IC constraints that do) while in the latter (“tough” buyer) case
the buyer’s induced IR constraint is the binding constraint.
We begin by noting that the set of all pairs ( p˜L, p˜H) that satisfy (10)-(13) comprises the
shaded region in Figure 1. In the absence of (14), therefore, the solution of (15) lies at point B.
Ifα ≤ α∗, then all points in the shaded region shown in Figure 1 satisfy (14). Hence:
Proposition 1 (“Soft” Buyer). If α ≤ α∗, then the second-best expected surplus E = (1−α)sH +
αsL.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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α
FIGURE 1. Soft Buyer: The feasible set whenα ≤ α∗
We continue with our argument (which turns to the characterization of the second-best ex-
pected surplus whenα > α∗) after the following remark that provides some intuition behind
Proposition 1 (a fuller discussion of this proposition is deferred to subsections 3.2 and 3.3).
Remark 1. Point B in Figure 1 depicts the second-best solution, which entails setting p˜L = α
and p˜H = 1−α or equivalently, pˆH = pˆL = 1/N. The intuition for this solution runs as fol-
lows. Since sH > sL, maximizing expected surplus entails making pˆH as large as possible. This
means (given admissibility) getting it to be as close to 1−αN as possible. But the IC constraint
pˆH ≤ pˆL bites, and hence pˆH = pˆL = pˆ. The desired conclusion then follows immediately
because of the admissibility requirement that the total probability with which trade occurs
cannot exceed one (i.e., Npˆ ≤ 1), and optimality then entails setting pˆ = 1/N. The following
observations shed further light on the second-best mechanism in the case under considera-
tion. Using Lemma 1, we obtain that in this case tˆH = tˆL = cH/N. An indirect mechanism
that implements the second-best is the following fixed-price mechanism: The buyer makes a
“take-it-or-leave-it” fixed-price offer, and then he chooses amongst those sellers who accept
to trade at the announced price. It is easy to verify that there exists a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of this indirect mechanism in which the buyer announces that he is willing to trade
at price equal to cH, each seller of either type accepts to trade at this price, and the buyer then
selects to trade with each seller with equal probability (which is 1/N). The expected surplus
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generated in this equilibrium is
N
(
1
N
[
(1−α)sH +αsL
])
,
which equals (1−α)sH +αsL, the second-best expected surplus. The buyer’s expected payoff
equals N[(ve − cH)/N] = ve − cH (where ve ≡ (1 −α)vH +αvL), which is greater than or
equal to zero if and only if α ≤ α∗ (which is, of course, the hypothesis of Proposition 1).
The expected payoffs to a high-type seller and a low-type seller are respectively zero and
(cH − cL)/N.
Now let us return to the main argument and assume thatα > α∗. In this case not all points
in the shaded region shown in Figure 1 satisfy (14). Figures 2 and 3 show how (14) affects the
feasible set depending on whether or not point A remains a feasible point. Point A remains a
feasible point if and only if the following inequality holds:
(16) sL ≥ (1−α)
N−1
1− (1−α)N
[
α(vH − cL)− sH
]
.
Since the RHS of (16) is strictly decreasing in N, converges to zero in the limit as N → ∞ and
is strictly greater than sL when N = 1, there exists an N∗, where N∗ ≥ 2, such that (16) holds
if and only if N ≥ N∗.
If point A does remain a feasible point (i.e., N ≥ N∗), then the shaded region shown in
Figure 2 comprises the feasible set; in this case the solution of (15) lies at point C. If, on the
other hand, point A does not remain a feasible point (i.e., 1 ≤ N < N∗), then the shaded
region shown in Figure 3 comprises the feasible set; in this case the solution of (15) lies at
point D. Hence:
Proposition 2 (“Tough” Buyer). Assume that vL < cH. Ifα > α∗ and:
(i) [Large Markets]. If N ≥ N∗ (i.e., (16) holds), then the second-best expected surplus
E =
α(cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1−α)(sH − sL) .
(ii) [Small Markets]. If 1 ≤ N < N∗ (i.e., (16) does not hold), then the second-best expected surplus
E =
α[1− (1−α)N ](cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1−α)sH .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Remark 2. Notice that the fixed-pricemechanism of Remark 1 does not implement the second-
best mechanism here since it would give the buyer a negative expected payoff.10 This is con-
sistent with the observation— obtainable from Figures 2 and 3— that the buyer’s induced IR
constraint plays a decisive role in pinning down the second best mechanism. This constraint,
it may be recalled, is the buyer’s IR constraint after the transfers implied by the low-type’s IC
10Recall that his expected payoff in this indirect mechanism is non-negative if and only ifα ≤ α∗.
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FIGURE 2. Tough Buyer and Large Market: The feasible set when α > α∗, and
inequality (16) holds (i.e., N ≥ N∗).
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D
p˜H
α
FIGURE 3. Tough Buyer and Small Market: The feasible set when α > α∗, and
inequality (16) does not hold (i.e., 1 ≤ N < N∗).
constraint and the high-type’s IR constraint are factored into it. If N is sufficiently small —
how small depends on the “tightness” of the buyer’s induced IR constraint (cf. Figures 2 and
3) — then the total probability with which trade occurs is strictly less than one. Only when
the market has enough sellers does trade occur for sure, although with positive probability
the “wrong” object is traded (i.e., a lemon is traded instead of a peach).
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3.3. Comparison with the First-Best. The first-best lies at point F; this is because (since sH >
sL), in the first-best trade occurs with a high-type seller unless all sellers are of low type.
Hence, the first-best has p˜H = 1−αN and p˜L = αN . It thus follows that the first-best cannot
be attained by the second-best mechanism except in the special case when there is a single
seller and the buyer is soft (in this special case, points F and B in Figure 1 coincide). We
summarize this in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Comparison with the First-Best). The second-best mechanism cannot attain the first-
best (except in the special case when the market contains a single seller who owns a lemon with a
sufficiently small probability).
So, the second-best mechanism does not in general implement the first-best outcome. This
result shows that Akerlof’s (1970) central message about the inefficiency of lemons markets
— which he developed in the context of perfectly competitive markets — is robust to im-
perfect competition. As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2, when the market contains a suf-
ficient number of sellers, trade occurs with probability one. The second-best mechanism is
inefficient, however, because of allocative inefficiency: trade occurs with positive probability
between the buyer and a low-type seller even when the market contains a high-type seller.
To understand this better, note that when N is large, it is commonly known that a fraction α
are low-type sellers and 1 −α high-type sellers. However, this information cannot be used
to identify whether a given seller is a high-type or a low-type. The uncertainty regarding the
type of a seller remains and this explains why the allocative inefficiency persists even in the
limit.
3.4. The Role of Competition. Using the results established above, we can now answer the
following two questions of interest: (i) What impact does an increase in the number of com-
peting sellers have on the second-best expected surplus? and (ii) What impact does an in-
crease in the number of competing sellers have on relative efficiency (i.e., the “distance” be-
tween the second-best and first-best expected surpluses)?11
Using Figures 1–3, it is easy to see that (i) ifα ≤ α∗, then the level of second-best expected
surplus E is independent of N; and (ii) if α > α∗, then there is an integer N∗ (where N∗ ≥ 2)
such that E is strictly increasing in N over the interval [1,N∗), attains the same or a higher
value at N∗ as it does at N∗ − 1, and is a constant for all N ≥ N∗. Figure 4 illustrates the
various possibilities.
11It should be noted that a change in N alters not only the number of competing sellers but also the information
structure facing the buyer. As such, although we interpret the comparative-static results derived below in terms
of the effects of competition on the second-best mechanism, our results, to some extent, reflect the consequence of
jointly changing the number of sellers and the information structure. Having said this, these comparative-static
results do provide some insight into how changing the number of sellers can impact on second-best efficiency.
Although the point noted here also applies to the literature on markets with private values (see, for example,
Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994)), which proceeds as we do, it would be useful to find a way to de-
termine the effects of changing the number of competing sellers while keeping the information structure constant.
We leave this for future research.
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N
αsL + (1−α)sH
α2 (cH−cL)sL
α(cH−cL )−(1−α)sH
α(cH−cL )sL
α(cH−cL )−(1−α)(sH−sL )
E(N;α > α∗)
E(N;α ≤ α∗)
G(N) = αNsL + (1−αN)sH
FIGURE 4. The relationship between efficiency and the number of sellers,
where G(.) and E(.) respectively denote the first-best and second-best ex-
pected surpluses.
Thus, second-best expected surplus does not change with an increase in the number of
competing sellers once the market contains a certain critical number of them. This is a sur-
prising result. It implies, moreover, that if there is an infinitesimal cost of getting a seller into
the market, then second-best welfare (i.e., second-best expected surplus minus the total cost
of having N sellers in the market) is strictly decreasing in the degree of market competition
N, once it is sufficiently intense. Contrary to conventional wisdom, only a limited degree of
competition is good; too much is bad. In particular, if the buyer is “soft” then the optimal
number of sellers is one, and if the buyer is “tough” then the optimal number of sellers is
N∗ ≥ 2. To put it differently, if the likelihood of sellers owning lemons is small then a bilateral
monopoly is the optimal market structure, but if the likelihood of sellers owning lemons is high then an
oligopoly is the optimal market structure.
The first-best expected surplus G is strictly increasing in N.12 Hence, if the buyer is soft,
then relative efficiency is strictly decreasing in the degree of market competition. But if the
buyer is tough, then the relationship between relative efficiency and the degree of competition
12First-best expected surplus (for any sL and sH) is G = αNsL+(1−α)NsH + [1−αN− (1−α)N ]max{sL , sH}.
Thus, when sH > sL, G = αNsL + (1−αN)sH .
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is a bit more complex: For sufficiently large markets relative efficiency is strictly decreasing
in the degree of market competition, but for sufficiently small markets it can be increasing,
decreasing or non-monotonic since both E and G are strictly increasing in N over the range
[1,N∗). Finally, notice that in the limit as N tends to infinity, the second-best mechanism
does not attain the first-best.13 The following corollary summarizes two of our main insights
regarding the role of market competition:
Corollary 2 (Role of Competition). The second-best expected surplus does not change with any
increase in the number of competing sellers once the market contains a certain critical number of them.
Moreover, the second-best mechanism becomes less efficient relative to the first-best with any further
increase in the degree of competition beyond a certain critical point.
4. EXTENSIONS
4.1. Lemons Generate Higher Surplus. We now consider our baseline model with the al-
ternative (but relatively less plausible) scenario in which the surplus from trading a lemon
is higher than the surplus from trading a peach (i.e., with the alternative assumption that
sL > sH). It is easy to verify that all the arguments and preliminary results contained in
subsections 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 carry over to this scenario. The arguments leading to the charac-
terization of the second-best mechanism are based on those presented in section 3.2, and the
proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in Appendix A deal with both scenarios at the same time. It is
shown that if sL > sH, then the second-best solution is depicted by point A in Figures 1 and 2
for the soft buyer and tough buyer, large market cases, respectively. And by point D in Figure
3 for the tough buyer, small market case. Thus, when sL > sH, we have:
(a) Ifα ≤ α∗, then E = (1−α)NsH + [1− (1−α)N ]sL.
(b) Ifα > α∗ and N ≥ N∗, then E = (1−α)NsH + [1− (1−α)N ]sL
(c) Ifα > α∗ and 1 ≤ N < N∗, then E = α[1− (1−α)
N ](cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1−α)sH .
The first-best lies at point A; this is because (since sH < sL), in the first-best, trade oc-
curs with a low-type seller unless all sellers are of high type; and hence the first-best has
p˜H = (1−α)N and p˜L = 1− (1−α)N . This means that the second-best mechanism attains
the first best outcome provided that it is not the case that the buyer is tough and 1 ≤ N < N∗
(in this case Figure 3 applies, and points A and D are different). Consequently, if first-best
requires trading a lemon rather than a peach, then the second-best mechanism attains the
first-best except in the special case when the market contains a sufficiently small number of
sellers each of whom owns a lemon with a sufficiently large probability. In this latter case,
second-best expected surplus is strictly increasing in the degree of market competition. Fur-
thermore, relative efficiency, E/G, is strictly increasing in the degree of market competition,
13It may be noted that, in contrast, in markets with other kinds of asymmetric information the first-best is typ-
ically attainable in the limit as the number of traders increases without bound (see, eg., Rustichini, Satterthwaite
and Williams (1994), who establish such a limiting result in markets with private values.)
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N, over the range [1,N∗), and then E/G = 1 for all N ≥ N∗. These results are consistent with
conventional wisdom that more competition is better, but of course this is valid only in those
lemons markets in which trading a lemon generates a higher social surplus than trading a
peach.
4.2. Many Buyers. In Appendix B we extend our baseline model to a set-up in which the
market contains an arbitrary number M of buyers. It turns out that the analysis and the
results for the case when M < N are essentially the same as for the single buyer case. In
particular, the second-best mechanism becomes less efficient relative to the first-best when
the number of competing sellers is increased beyond a certain critical number. The analysis
and results for the case when M ≥ N are however different. For example, it is shown that
increasing the number of sellers (while maintaining the number of buyers at least equal to
the number of sellers) does not affect relative efficiency (the ratio of the second-best expected
surplus to the first-best).14
4.3. Buyer Heterogeneity. The negative results established above raises the question as to
whether there is any way of overcoming them. In Muthoo and Mutuswami (2005) we have
studied an extension to our baseline model that allows for private information on the buyer’s
side. One might think that introducing private information on the buyers side will add to
the inefficiency; this, though, is not necessarily correct because the private information on the
buyers side can be used to relax the low-type seller’s incentive constraint.
In the extended set-up there are two types of the buyer, one for whom the surplus from
trading a peach is more and the other for whom the surplus from trading a lemon is higher.
Then, the socially optimal decision — viz., which type of good to transfer — depends on the
type of the buyer which is unknown to the seller. In this extended scenario, it is no longer
clear that a low-type seller wants to pretend to be a high-type: indeed, if the probability that
a buyer is a “low” type is sufficiently high, then she would not want to do so. This raises the
possibility that the inefficiency resulting from the seller’s private information can be corrected
by allowing for private information on the buyer’s side.
Of course, introducing two types of the buyer makes the mechanism design problem more
complex because we have to deal with additional individual rationality and incentive com-
patibility constraints. We have not been able to characterize the solution to the resulting
mechanism design problem completely. However, we have been able to determine restric-
tions on parameters which ensure that when the number of sellers is large enough, then we
14Although we study a market with arbitrary, finite numbers of buyers and sellers, these numbers are exoge-
nously given. As such, our model is a partial equilibrium one. It would be useful to extend our framework by
explicitly modeling entry, and thereby determining the numbers of buyers and sellers in themarket endogenously,
as part of equilibrium. Such an extension is beyond the scope of the current paper, and so we leave it for future
research, with the following observations. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and others have pointed out that in markets
with asymmetric information, the quantity supplied need not equal the quantity demanded in equilibrium. Based
in part on this observation, we conjecture that in a extended framework in which entry is explicitly modeled, there
will, in equilibrium, be an excess of those traders who possess the private information on the quality of the goods
traded (sellers in our set-up).
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can find an asymptotically efficient mechanism. Our results in this regard suggest that while
asymptotic efficiency in a market for lemons settings is not a generic phenomenon, there are
still significant cases where it is possible.
4.4. Correlation. In our baseline model, the sellers’ types are independently distributed. One
might ask, if by allowing for correlation, one can obtain positive results as in Cre´mer and
McLean (1988). They showed that if agents’ types are correlated, then one can construct a two-
stage ‘augmented mechanism’ which implements the same outcome as the original mecha-
nism, but where all agents’ informational rents are driven down to zero. This fact can be used
to implement efficient (first-best) outcomes in some circumstances provided the efficient out-
come is implementable without requiring budget balance: essentially, one can construct an
‘augmented mechanism’ which recovers from the agents the implicit subsidy needed to im-
plement the efficient outcome. Thus, the key to seeing whether correlation amongst sellers’
types can help in our context is to see whether we can implement the efficient outcome if we
do not require individual rationality and/or budget balance. Note, however, that incentive
compatibility by itself requires that pˆH ≤ pˆL and this condition implies inefficiency whenever
sH > sL. Therefore, the first-best outcome is unimplementable even if we are willing to give
up budget balance and individual rationality and this shows that small correlation amongst
sellers’ types in unlikely to change the nature of our results.
4.5. Continuum of Types. Another interesting extension that one could consider is to allow
for a continuum of quality levels: that is, each seller’s object is of quality q where q lies in a
compact interval [q, q]. Such an extended set-up with a continuum of sellers’ types introduces
two kinds of complications into our baseline model. First, the computation of the first-best
level of surplus for a given number of sellers becomes complex because the optimal allocation
depends on the net surplus function s(q) = v(q) − c(q) about which nothing can be said a
priori, where v(q) and c(q) respectively are a buyer’s and a seller’s reservations values for an
object of quality q. Second, while one can extend the techniques introduced in Samuelson
(1984) for the bilateral lemons context to setup the problem for the general case of many
buyers and many sellers, solving the resulting problem analytically is not straightforward.
Themain difference between amodel with two types of sellers and onewith a continuum of
sellers’ types is that incentive compatibility is a much more restrictive constraint in the latter.
Intuitively, and very loosely, this suggests that the set of feasible mechanisms “shrinks” when
we move from a two-type model to a continuum of types model. In our case, however, the
main results that we have obtained with a two-type model are essentially negative, and this
suggests that introducing a continuum of types model is unlikely to change the nature of
these results.
4.6. Mechanisms involving Third Parties. The combination of individual rationality and
budget balance implies that there is no active role for third parties in the trading mechanisms
that we consider. Mezzetti (2004) shows that if the active involvement of third parties is
allowed, then it is possible to do better. Specifically, Mezzetti considers a mechanism of the
following type: (a) In the first stage, the sellers report their types; (b) In the second stage, a
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decision is made as to which seller transfers her object to the buyer. No transfers are made at
this stage; (c) After the object is transferred, the buyer and the sellers report their payoffs. The
transfers are made on the basis of the reports of the buyer in the third stage. The key feature
of this mechanism is that the trading decision is separated from the transfers whereas they
are simultaneously determined in our mechanisms.
While this is an interesting mechanism and Mezzetti (2004) shows that it can implement
the efficient outcome in a bilateral lemons context, it should be noted that the mechanism (i)
requires budgets to be not balanced off-the-equilibrium path, (ii) requires an active third party
(since budget is not always balanced off equilibrium), (iii) is vulnerable to collusion between
the buyer and the third party. These aspects make it difficult to justify this mechanism as a
“reasonable” trading mechanism in a market context.
5. DISCUSSION AND RELATED LITERATURE
5.1. Non-Monotonicity. One aspect of our results, both in the benchmark and the extended
models, is that relative efficiency — the “distance” between second-best and first-best ex-
pected surpluses — may be a non-monotonic function of the number of sellers. In the bench-
mark model, non-monotonicity arises when the probability that each seller owns a lemon is
high enough so that the high quality object cannot be transferred with probability one even
when all traders report that they have high quality objects.15 When one adds additional sell-
ers, the achievable expected surplus increases because the probability that all traders have
high quality objects decreases. However, the first-best level of expected surplus also increases,
and so it is not clear what happens to relative efficiency.
5.2. Impact of Market Size. Our analysis so far has involved holding the number of buyers
constant while changing the number of sellers. In contrast, the literature in the private values
case has considered the more traditional replication scenario, where the number of buyers
and sellers are both varied while keeping the buyer-seller ratio constant. We have been able
to derive limited results with regard to the impact on efficiency of changing the market size
for our benchmark model and they are commensurate with the results that we obtain when
only the number of sellers is changed.
If N ≤ M (the number of buyers is more than the number of sellers), then the analysis (in
Appendix B) shows that replicating this economy has no impact on market efficiency. The
more interesting case is when M < N. We can divide the analysis of this case into various
sub-cases.
5.2.1. The case in which M < N, α ≤ α∗, and sH > sL. Here, as can be seen from Figure
8 (in Appendix B), the “induced individual rationality constraint of the buyer” (given by
p˜H[sH −α(vH − cL) + p˜L(1−α)sL ≥ 0) does not bind. The first-best involves p˜H = N(1−
α)bH , p˜L = M − N(1 −α)bH which is point F on the diagram. Hence, the first-best level
of surplus is given by EM = N(1−α)bHsH + [M − N(1−α)bH]sL. The achievable level of
15This is the case illustrated in Figure 3.
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surplus (given by point B on the diagram) corresponds to p˜H = (1−α)M, p˜L = αM and is
given by E∗ = (1−α)MsH +αMsL. Hence, the level of market efficiency is given by
E∗
EM
=
M[(1−α)sH +αsL]
N(1−α)bHsH + [M− N(1−α)bH]sL .
What happens when the market is replicated so that we have γM buyers and γN sellers
where γ > 1? The level of market efficiency is now given by
E∗
EM
(γ) =
M[(1−α)sH +αsL]
N(1−α)bH(γ)sH + [M− N(1−α)bH(γ)]sL
where bH(γ) is the value of bH (given by (B.1)) when there are γM buyers and γN sellers. We
are unable to show formally that bH(γ) is increasing in γ though simulation with a variety
of parameters suggests it. Assuming that bH(γ) is increasing in γ, this means that market
efficiency decreases as a function of market size. This is illustrated by the simulation in Figure
5.16
5.2.2. The case of M < N, α > α∗, and sH > sL. There are two possibilities here illustrated
by Figures 9 and 10. In Figure 9, the optimal solution lies at point C which is above point A.
Here, the situation corresponds to the previous subcase and market efficiency decreases as a
function of market size because the distance between point C (the second-best) and point F
(the first-best) increases as the market size grows. In Figure 10, the optimal solution is at point
D. When the market size increases—at least, initially—market efficiency increases because
the distance between point D and point F decreases. However, this cannot last because at
some stage, the situation must revert to the one depicted in Figure 9 and at this point, market
efficiency starts to decrease. Note that what is happening here is similar to what happens
when we increase the number of sellers only. Figure 6 depicts a simulation corresponding to
this sub-case.
5.2.3. The case in which M < N and sL > sH. Here, if the first-best is achievable (point A
in Figures 8–9) then we will continue to achieve the first-best even when we replicate this
market. So, we start with a situation of full efficiency and continue to get it as the market
is replicated. Figure 10, however, illustrates that the first-best (point A) may not always be
achievable. Here, replicating the market can increase market efficiency as the simulation in
Figure 7 shows. This is similar to what happened when we increased the number of sellers
only. However, when we increase the number of sellers only, we also showed that asymptotic
efficiency was always obtained. Since we are increasing the numbers of both sellers and
buyers here, we might intuitively suspect that asympototic efficiency may not obtain. Figure
7 shows that this intuition is correct.17
16The parameters used in Figure 5 are α = 0.35, vH = 2.25, vL = 1.15 and in Figure 6, α = 0.75, vH =
2.25, vL = 1.1. Note that all simulations have been done starting with an initial setting of M = 1,N = 2 and
cH = 2, cL = 1.
17The parameters used for the simulation depicted in Figure 7 are vL = 1.15, vH = 2.05 andα = 0.35.
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FIGURE 5. Market efficiency v/s Market size when sH > sL illustrating de-
creasing efficiency with increasing market size.
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FIGURE 6. Market efficiency v/s Market size when sH > sL illustrating non-
monotonic behaviour of the efficiency ratio.
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FIGURE 7. Market efficiency v/s Market size when sL > sH
5.3. Related literature. The literature on the market for lemons is too large to be summarized
here; we confine ourselves to discussing those papers which have a direct bearing on our
paper. The use of the mechanism design methodology can be regarded as a direct follow-up
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to the work of Samuelson (1984) who studied the bilateral lemons problem; our extension
consists of analyzing the general case of finite but arbitrary number of sellers and buyers.18
The inefficiency pointed to by Akerlof (1970) has prompted economists to examine ways
by which this inefficiency can be overcome. For instance, Klein and Leffler (1981) and Tirole
(1996) have suggested that repeated interactions may overcome the adverse selection prob-
lem; on another dimension, the works of Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Janssen and Roy (2002)
and Hendel, Lizzeri and Siniscalchi (2004) suggest that particular features of the durable
goods market, when taken into account, can overcome partially or even fully the inefficiency
associated with the lemons market.
Our extended model is in the same spirit as these papers; however, there are two differ-
ences. Firstly, the other papers mostly use models with a continuum of agents; their models
cannot therefore directly address the question of interest to us which is the impact of compe-
tition on market efficiency. In this context, note that in our extended model, we need private
information on the buyers’ side as well as a large number of sellers to obtain efficiency. Sec-
ondly, in contrast to the other papers which use the dynamic element, our extended model is
still a static one and as such, closer to the basic Akerlof model. Our results thus show that it is
possible to obtain asymptotic efficiency even in markets for non-durable goods and without
using repeated game effects.19
APPENDIX A: OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma can be established using standard techniques. Here is an outline of
the argument:
(I) Incentive Compatibility implies that pˆH ≤ pˆL: We can write (1) and (2) as
( pˆH − pˆL)cH ≤ tˆH − tˆL ≤ ( pˆH − pˆL)cL.
The result follows since cH > cL.
(II) For each type of seller, either her incentive compatibility constraint binds or her individual rationality
constraints binds: Suppose, to the contrary, that neither (1) nor (3) bind for the high-type seller. Then,
one can increase the expected surplus by increasing pˆH and lowering tˆH without violating incentive
compatibility or individual rationality. The same argument applies with respect to the low-type seller.
(III) It cannot be the case that both incentive compatibility constraints bind: Suppose, to the contrary, that
this is the case. Then, neither individual rationality constraint can bind. We can thus increase the
expected surplus by increasing pˆH and pˆL both by  > 0 and decreasing tˆH and tˆL both by δ > 0. Note
18See also Evans (1989), Vincent (1989), Gul and Postlewaite (1992), and Manelli and Vincent (1995).
19It is interesting to note that in the context of standard models of oligopolistic price competition but with
the novel feature that consumers engage in costly search, Stahl (1989) and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004)
have shown that under certain conditions, increasing the number competing firms reduces welfare, and that the
optimal market structure is one with a small number of firms. Furthermore, under some conditions there can
be a non-monotonic relationship between welfare and the number of competing firms. These results, which are
derived by bringing the standard oligopoly and search models together within a single framework, challenge the
conventional wisdom that welfare is increasing in the number of firms. Although these results are derived in a
world with symmetric information, they nonetheless offer an interesting parallel to the “similar” results obtained
in the current paper in the context of lemons markets.
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that these changes do not affect the incentive compatibility constraints. If  and δ are small enough,
then the individual rationality constraints are unaffected.
(IV) It cannot be the case that the high-type seller’s incentive compatibility constraint and the low-type
seller’s individual rationality constraint bind: Suppose, to the contrary, that this is the case. Then, we have
tˆH = tˆL +( pˆH − pˆL)cH = pˆLcL +( pˆH − pˆL)cH . Therefore, tˆH − pˆHcH = pˆLcL +( pˆH − pˆL)cH − pˆHcH =
pˆL(cL − cH). Since cL < cH , this implies that we must have pˆL = 0, which in turn implies that
pˆH = 0, and via the incentive compatibility constraints, that tˆH = tˆL. This implies that both incentive
compatibility constraints bind, a contradiction.
Hence, at a solution to (9), inequalities (2) and (3) will be binding constraints.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that (pˆH , pˆL, tˆH , tˆL) solves the mechanism design problem (9). Then,
p˜H = N(1 −α) pˆH and p˜L = Nα pˆL satisfy (10)–(14), and so E ≤ E∗. Now suppose that ( p˜H , p˜L)
solves the reduced-form mechanism design problem (15). Define pˆH = p˜H/N(1−α), pˆL = p˜L/Nα,
tˆH = pˆHcH , and tˆL = pˆLcL + pˆH(cH − cL). It is straightforward to verify that (pˆH , pˆL, tˆH , tˆL) satisfies
(1)–(8), and hence E∗ ≤ E. Therefore E = E∗.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.20 We conveniently break our argument into twomain cases, depend-
ing on whether Z is negative or positive, where
Z ≡ sH −α(vH − cL)
is the coefficient of p˜H in (14). First consider the case when Z ≥ 0 (i.e., α < sH/(vH − cL)).21 In this
case (14) can be rewritten as
p˜H ≥
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
p˜L,
and hence (since Z ≥ 0) the feasible set of the maximization problem (15) is the shaded region in
Figure 1. It thus follows that in this case the unique solution of (15) is at point B if sH > sL and at point
A if sH < sL, i.e.,
( p˜L, p˜H) =
⎧⎨
⎩(α, 1−α) if sH > sL,(1− (1−α)N , (1−α)N) if sH < sL.
Now consider the case when Z < 0 (i.e.,α > sH/(vH − cL)). In this case (14) can be rewritten as
p˜H ≤
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
p˜L.
Notice that in this case the line
(A.1) p˜H =
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
p˜L
is positively sloped; whereas in the previous case when Z ≥ 0, the line (A.1) was non-positively
sloped. There are three subcases to consider here, depending on the relative position of the line (A.1).
If the slope of the line (A.1) is greater than or equal to (1−α)/α — which is the case if and only
if α ≤ α∗ — then (A.1) lies above the line p˜H = [(1 −α)/α] p˜L, and hence the feasible set of the
20Since it is convenient to do so, the argument here establishes Propositions 1 and 2 which concern the baseline
model in which sH > sL, but also establishes the corresponding results stated in subsection 4.1 that concern the
scenario in which sL > sH .
21It may be noted that sH/(vH − cL) < α∗, and hence this case refers to Proposition 1.
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maximization problem (15) in this case [when α ∈ (sH/(vH − cL),α∗)] continues to be the shaded
region in Figure 1. It thus follows that in this case the unique solution of (15) is the same as for the case
above whenα < sH/(vH − cL).
Now suppose thatα > α∗—whichmeans that the line (A.1) lies below the line p˜H = [(1−α)/α] p˜L.
This is shown in Figures 2 and 3, depending on whether it intersects the line p˜H + p˜L = 1 to the left
of (or at) point A or to the right of point A. After some simplification, it can be shown that the former
is the case if and only if inequality (16) holds; and that the latter is the case if and only if (16) does not
hold — notice that Proposition 2(i) concerns the former case while Proposition 2(ii) the latter.
When (16) holds, the unique solution of (15) lies, as shown in Figure 2, at point C if sH > sL and at
point A if sH < sL, i.e.,
( p˜L, p˜H) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[ −Z
(1−α)sL − Z ,
(1−α)sL
(1−α)sL − Z
]
if sH > sL,
(1− (1−α)N , (1−α)N) if sH < sL.
When (16) does not hold, then the unique solution of (15) lies, as shown in Figure 3, at point D, i.e.,
p˜L = 1− (1−α)N and p˜H =
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
[1− (1−α)N ].
APPENDIX B: GENERALIZATION TO THE MANY-BUYERS CASE
The only difference between the mechanism design problem with M = 1, as stated in (9), and the
problem with an arbitrary number M of buyers concern the three admissibility conditions. Suppose
there are k sellers in all reporting that they are of type H. Let pqk denote the probability that a q type
seller sells his product in this state of the world. Since symmetry implies that all q-type sellers must be
treated identically, it follows that
pHk ≤ min{1,M/k} for k > 0 and pLk ≤ min{1,M/(N − k)} for k < N.
Taking expectations across all possible realizations of k, these conditions imply that the mechanism
must satisfy the following two conditions:
(B.1) pˆH ≤
N−1
∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1−α)kαN−1−k min
{
1,
M
k+ 1
}
and
(B.2) pˆL ≤
N−1
∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1−α)kαN−1−k min
{
1,
M
N − k
}
Furthermore, since the expected number of objects transferred to the buyers must be less than or equal
to min{M,N}, the mechanism must also satisfy
(B.3) N[(1−α) pˆH +α pˆL] ≤ min{M,N}.
The mechanism design problem for an arbitrary M and arbitrary N is:
(B.4) E ≡ max
pˆH , pˆL ,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL
]
subject to (1)–(5) and (B.1)–(B.3).
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The Case of M < N. We solve the mechanism design problem (B.4) in this case in exactly the same
manner as we did above for the case when M = 1. The only difference is that now the three admissi-
bility constraints (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) respectively become (using the same change of variables)
(B.5) p˜H ≤ N(1−α)bH ,
(B.6) p˜L ≤ NαbL and
(B.7) p˜L + p˜H ≤ M,
where bH and bL respectively denote the right-hand sides of (B.1) and (B.2). Hence, the mechanism
design problem (B.4) for the case whenM < N can be solved by instead solving the following reduced-
form problem:
(B.8) E ≡ max
p˜H , p˜L
p˜HsH + p˜LsL
subject to (13)–(14) and (B.5)–(B.7) .
With the aid of Figures 8-10 — which parallel Figures 1–3 — it is relatively easy to characterize the
solution to (B.8) by using exactly the same arguments to those used in establishing Propositions 1 and
2.22 In discussing the impact of the degree of competition on the second-best mechanism, we keep M
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p˜L
p˜H =
[ 1−α
α
]
p˜L
p˜H [sH −α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1−α)sL = 0
F
B
A
p˜H
p˜H + p˜L = M
NαbLMα
N(1−α)bH
M(1−α)
FIGURE 8. The feasible set when M < N andα ≤ α∗.
fixed at some arbitrary level and allow N to vary over the set {M+ 1,M+ 2, . . .}. First, consider the
case when the buyers are soft. We first note that when sL > sH then point A in Figure 8 depicts both
the second-best outcome and the first-best outcome. On the other hand, when sH > sL then point F
22It should be noted that both bH and bL are bounded from below by M/N. Furthermore, bH and bL are
respectively bounded from above by M(1−αN)/N(1−α) and M[1− (1−α)N ]/Nα.
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p˜H [sH −α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1−α)sL = 0
B
C
p˜H
N(1−α)bH
M(1−α)
Mα NαbL
p˜H + p˜L = M
FIGURE 9. The feasible set when M < N,α > α∗ and point C lies above point A.
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p˜L
p˜H =
[ 1−α
α
]
p˜L
F
B
A
p˜H [sH −α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1−α)sL = 0
D
p˜H
p˜H + p˜L = M
Mα NαbL
M(1−α)
N(1−α)bH
FIGURE 10. The feasible set when M < N, α > α∗ and point C, which is not
shown, lies below point A.
depicts the first-best outcome while point B the second-best outcome. Since point B is unaffected by N
while point F moves upwards along the p˜H + p˜L = M line, where the former means that the second-
best expected surplus is independent of N while the latter means that first-best expected surplus is
increasing in N, we obtain that relative efficiency is decreasing in N (for a fixed M < N).
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Now consider the case when the buyers are tough. Just like in the single buyer case it can be shown
that point C lies above point A (and hence Figure 9 applies) when N ≥ N∗, where N∗ ≥ 2; and that C
lies below A (and hence Figure 10 applies) when N < N∗.
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1
1
(1−α) pˆH +α pˆL = 1
FIGURE 11. The feasible set when M ≥ N andα ≤ α∗.
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FIGURE 12. The feasible set when M ≥ N andα > α∗
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The Case ofM ≥ N. Since M ≥ N, it follows that bH = bL = 1 (i.e., it is possible for all sellers to sell
their objects since the total number of buyers exceeds the number of sellers). Hence, the admissibility
conditions (B.1) and (B.2) respectively become
(B.9) pˆH ≤ 1 and
(B.10) pˆL ≤ 1.
Since M ≥ N the admissibility condition (B.3) becomes:
(B.11) (1−α) pˆH +α pˆL ≤ 1
Finally, since the analysis in section 3.1 applies, it follows that the relevant IC and IR conditions are
[after undoing the change of variables]:
(B.12) pˆH ≤ pˆL and
(B.13) pˆH
[
sH −α(vH − cL)
]
+α pˆLsL ≥ 0.
This means that the mechanism design problem (B.4) becomes:
(B.4) E ≡ max
pˆH , pˆL ,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL
]
subject to (B.9)–(B.13).
Figures 11 and 12 respectively illustrate the feasible sets for the soft buyer and tough buyer cases. In
both figures, the efficient point is defined uniquely by the intersection of the three admissibility con-
straints; this is point B in both diagrams. Figure 11 shows that whenα ≤ α∗, the first-best is achievable
even with one seller (and at least one buyer). Increasing the number of sellers while maintaining the
number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers preserves efficiency. When α > α∗, on the
other hand, Figure 12 shows that the first-best is no longer achievable. Increasing the number of sellers
(while maintaining the number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers) has no effect on the
ability to achieve efficiency.
REFERENCES
Akerlof, G. (1970), “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.
Cre´mer, J. and R. P. McLean (1988), “Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strat-
egy auctions,” Econometrica, 56, 1247-1257.
Evans, R. (1989), “Sequential bargaining with correlated values,” Review of Economic Studies, 56,
499-510.
Gresik, T. and M.A. Satterthwaite (1989), “The rate at which a simple market becomes efficient as
the number of traders increases: an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 48, 304-332.
Gul, F. and A. Postlewaite (1992), “ Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies with asym-
metric information,” Econometrica, 60, 1273-1292.
Hendel, I., and A. Lizzeri (1999), “Adverse selection in durable goods markets,” American Economic
Review December, 1097-1115.
Hendel, I., A. Lizzeri and M. Siniscalchi (2004), “Efficient sorting in a dynamic adverse-selection
model,” forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies.
COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY 27
Janssen, M. and S. Roy (2002), “Dynamic trading in durable good market with asymmetric informa-
tion,” International Economic Review, 43:1, 257-282.
Janssen, M. and J.L. Moraga-Gonzalez (2004), “Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search, and the Number
of Firms,” Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1089-1118.
Klein, B. and K. B. Leffler (1981), “The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance,”
Journal of Political Economy, 89, 615-641.
Manelli, A.M. and D. R. Vincent (1995), “Optimal Procurement Mechanisms,” Econometrica, 63, 591-
620.
Mezzetti, C. (2004), “Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency” Econometrica,
72, 1617-1626.
Muthoo, A. and Mutuswami (2005), “Competition and Efficiency in Markets with Quality Uncer-
tainty,” Department of Economics, University of Essex, Discussion Paper No. 593.
Myerson, R. and M.A. Satterthwaite (1983), “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 29, 265-281.
Rustichini, A., M.A. Satterthwaite and S.R. Williams (1994), “Convergence to efficiency in a simple
market with incomplete information,” Econometrica, 62, 1041-1064.
Samuelson, W. (1984), “Bargaining under asymmetric information,” Econometrica, 52, 992-1005.
Stahl, D.O. (1989), “Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search,” American Economic
Review, 79, 700-712.
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” Ameri-
can Economic Review, 71, 393-410.
Tirole, J. (1996), “A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the persistence of corrup-
tion and firm quality),” Review of Economic Studies, 63, 1-22.
Vincent, D. (1989), “Bargaining with common values,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48.
Wilson, C.A. (1979), “Equilibrium and Adverse Selection,” American Economic Review, 69, 313-317.
Wilson, C.A. (1980), “TheNature of Equilibrium inMarkets with Adverse Selection,” The Bell Journal
of Economics, 11, 108-130.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, WIVENHOE PARK, COLCHESTER CO4 3SQ, ENGLAND,
UK.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER, UNIVERSITY ROAD, LEICESTER LE1 7RH, ENG-
LAND, UK.
E-mail address: muthoo@essex.ac.uk
E-mail address: sm403@le.ac.uk
